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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 Nos. 16-1087 and 16-1877 
___________ 
 
ABDUL JALIL QURESHI, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                  Respondent 
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA No. A042-080-693 
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Honorable Miriam K. Mills) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 November 4, 2016 
 
 Before:  CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 








SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Abdul Jalil Qureshi, a citizen of the United Kingdom, was deemed removable 
from the United States based on two convictions for sexual offenses, and denied 
discretionary cancellation of removal by an Immigration Judge.  Qureshi appealed to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals and separately moved for remand to withdraw his 
counseled oral pleadings in which he conceded removability.  The BIA denied his motion 
for remand and dismissed his appeal.  Qureshi seeks review of that BIA order, as well as 
review of a separate BIA order denying his subsequent motion to reconsider.  We will 
dismiss as untimely the petition for review of the BIA’s order denying the motion to 
remand and dismissing the appeal, and we will deny the petition for review of the BIA 
order denying the motion to reconsider. 
I. 
 Qureshi is a Pakistani national and citizen of the United Kingdom.1  He was 
admitted to the United States on March 19, 1989, as a lawful permanent resident.  On 
January 20, 1997, Qureshi pled guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of 
New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 130.55.  On March 27, 2008, Qureshi pled guilty to 
forcible touching in violation of NYPL § 130.52.  Qureshi was accused of rubbing his 
groin into the buttocks of two women, one a minor, with both instances taking place at 
Rockefeller Plaza during the Christmas season. 
 In September 2011, the Department of Homeland Security served Qureshi with a 
                                              
1 Qureshi was born in 1936 in Peshawar, which is now considered part of Pakistan.  At 
the time of Qureshi’s birth, Peshawar was considered a part of India and was under the 
rule of the British Empire.  Qureshi testified to having canceled his Pakistani citizenship 
when he moved to England and was naturalized as a British citizen.  A.R. 170.  
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Notice to Appear before an IJ.  The Notice charged him as being removable from the 
United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), based on his two convictions for crimes 
involving moral turpitude.  In March 2012, Qureshi appeared before the IJ and, through 
counsel, admitted to the allegations in the Notice to Appear and conceded his 
removability.  Qureshi applied for discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a) based on his long residence in the United States, family ties to his wife and 
five adult children, and alleged hardship to him and his wife that would result from his 
deportation.  He also claimed he was innocent of the charges to which he had pled guilty, 
contending the undercover officers involved in each incident fabricated the charges and 
he was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.   
 The IJ found Qureshi removable from the United States based on his counseled 
concessions.  The IJ then found Qureshi did not warrant discretionary cancellation of 
removal.  The IJ noted the seriousness of Qureshi’s crimes and suggested they 
demonstrated a pattern of wrongdoing, while finding Qureshi’s claims of innocence not 
credible.  The IJ also found Qureshi failed to establish any hardship to himself or his 
family because his claim to be in poor health undermined his claim that he needed to 
remain in the United States to care for his wife.2  None of Qureshi’s adult children 
submitted affidavits in support of his good character and rehabilitation or their need for 
                                              
2 For example, the IJ noted Qureshi claimed he was responsible for assisting his wife to 
the bathroom because she is unable to walk upstairs, where the bathroom is located.  But 
he also testified that, due to his own heart problem, he cannot climb stairs without 
stopping and can only push his wife in a wheelchair for short distances without becoming 
short of breath.  A.R. 124.   
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his continued presence in the United States.  Finally, the IJ observed there was no proof 
Qureshi had ever filed federal taxes.  On balance, the IJ concluded the equities weighed 
in favor of removing Qureshi to the United Kingdom. 
 Qureshi appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals and 
moved to remand proceedings to allow him to withdraw his counsel’s factual admissions 
and concession of removability.  He contended his 1997 conviction for sexual abuse was 
facially invalid because the complaint pertaining to the charge does not contain the 
predicate statutory element of lack of consent.  Qureshi also contended his prior counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by conceding his removability based on an invalid 
conviction.  The BIA rejected his argument on both procedural and substantive grounds.  
First, the BIA found Qureshi had not complied with the procedural requirements for 
seeking remand based on ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to provide 
evidence that he notified his prior counsel of the complaint he filed against her and 
provided her an opportunity to respond.  Second, the BIA found Qureshi’s argument for 
ineffective assistance unpersuasive because there was not a reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome of the proceedings would have been different absent counsel’s concession of 
Qureshi’s removability.  Finally, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of discretionary 
cancellation of removal.   
 The BIA issued its order on December 11, 2015.  Qureshi emailed a petition for 
review to the Third Circuit CM/ECF help desk on January 11, 2016.  A paper copy of the 
petition for review was received and filed on January 13, 2016. 
 While his petition for review of the BIA’s December 2015 order was pending, 
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Qureshi also filed a timely motion to reconsider with the BIA.  The BIA denied the 
motion, concluding Qureshi merely reiterated arguments the BIA had previously rejected 
and failed to identify any legal or factual errors, changes in law, or aspects of the case 
that were overlooked.  The BIA issued its order on March 14, 2016, and Qureshi filed a 
timely petition for review on April 11, 2016.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over a timely filed petition for review under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1252(a)(1), (b)(1).  A motion to remand is the functional equivalent of a motion to 
reopen.3 Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the BIA’s 
denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion, see Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 
131 (3d Cir. 2001), and review its underlying factual findings related to the motion for 
substantial evidence. See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2002). The 
BIA’s denial of a motion to remand may only be reversed if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.” Id. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We review the BIA’s 
denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion.  Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 
398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).   
A. 
 We lack jurisdiction over Qureshi’s petition for review of the BIA’s December 
2015 denial of his motion to remand and dismissal of his appeal because his petition for 
                                              
3 While we have held there is no meaningful difference between a motion to reopen and a 
motion to remand for purposes of determining our jurisdiction and the standard of review, 
Korytnyuk, 396 F.3d at 282, for the sake of clarity, we refer here to Qureshi’s “motion to 
remand.”   
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review was untimely filed.  By statute, Qureshi was required to file his petition for review 
no later than 30 days after the BIA issued its final order.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  In this 
case, Qureshi’s deadline to file his petition was January 11, 2016.4  In order to be 
formally filed, Qureshi was required to submit his petition for review in paper format by 
4:30 p.m., the time the clerk’s office was scheduled to close.  See Fed R. App. P. 
26(a)(4)(D) (setting deadline for filing other than by electronic means); Third Circuit 
L.A.R. 113.1(a) (requiring paper filing of case-initiating documents).  This deadline is 
mandatory, jurisdictional, and cannot be extended.  See Vakker v. Att’y Gen., 519 F.3d 
143, 146 (3d Cir. 2008).  Qureshi failed to meet this deadline.  His counsel emailed his 
petition for review to our CM/ECF help desk email address at 10:55 p.m. on January 11, 
2016.  The clerk’s office did not receive a paper copy of the petition—and thus, the 
petition was not filed—until January 13, 2016.     
 Qureshi asks us to exempt him from our rules requiring his petition to be filed in 
paper format and to accept his emailed petition as sufficient and timely.  We decline to do 
so.  Even if we were to permit Qureshi to file his petition electronically, an email to the 
CM/ECF help desk would not constitute an electronic filing.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
25(a)(2)(D) (electronic filing must be consistent with local rules and technical standards 
established by the Judicial Conference of the United States); Third Circuit L.A.R. 25.1(a) 
(documents must be filed electronically through CM/ECF); Third Circuit L.A.R. 113 
                                              
4 The BIA issued its order on December 11, 2015.  Because the end of the 30-day 
statutory period fell on Sunday, January 10, 2016, Qureshi’s deadline moved to the next 
business day—Monday, January 11, 2016.  See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 
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(establishing procedures for electronic filing through CM/ECF); Summary of Electronic 
Filing Requirements, 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/legacyfiles/summary%20of%20electronic%20filing.pdf 
(for case originating documents, including “petition for review of agency order,” counsel 
must, “if case is an emergency, call clerk’s office to get permission to e-mail”).  Further, 
we are not authorized to extend the time for filing Qureshi’s petition for review to 
construe his paper filing on January 13, 2016, as timely.  Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(2).5    
 Even if Qureshi’s petition for review of the initial BIA order had been timely filed, 
we would find the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying remand.  Qureshi’s 
counsel conceded he was twice convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.6  Qureshi 
is bound by his counsel’s factual admissions and concession of removability absent a 
showing of egregious circumstances.  Calla-Collado v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 680, 683 (3d 
Cir. 2011); In re Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986).  Qureshi has not 
shown egregious circumstances here.  Qureshi’s claim that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance fails because he cannot show both “competent counsel would have 
                                              
5 Qureshi attributes his untimely filing to a miscommunication between attorneys 
regarding who would file the petition for review.  Even if the rules permitted us to extend 
the time for filing for good cause, factors within the control of counsel or the client 
generally do not qualify as good cause.  See Joseph v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 651 F.3d 348, 
356 (3d Cir. 2011) (“a petitioner seeking an extension under L.A.R. 112.4(a) usually 
must demonstrate a need for more time based on an event or cause beyond the control of 
counsel or the petitioner”); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) advisory committee’s note 
(“The good cause standard . . . is usually occasioned by something that is not within the 
control of the movant.”). 
6 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is 
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude . . . is deportable.”   
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acted otherwise” and “a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if 
the error[s] . . . had not occurred.”7  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 157, 159 (3d Cir. 
2007) (internal quotations omitted, alterations in original).  Qureshi claims his counsel 
was ineffective for conceding removability in lieu of challenging the validity of the 
criminal complaint underlying his 1997 New York conviction.  But the BIA “has no 
authority to invalidate a state court judgment of conviction[,]” Medina Lopez v. Att’y 
Gen., 425 Fed. App’x 146, 150 (3d Cir. 2011), and we have held convictions are final and 
valid for immigration purposes “unless and until the convictions are overturned” as a 
result of a collateral attack filed in the proper court.8  Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 
196, 198–99 (3d Cir. 2008).  Even if Qureshi’s counsel had challenged the complaint as 
insufficient, the BIA was required to accept the resulting conviction as final and valid 
because it had not—and still has not—been overturned by a New York court pursuant to 
a properly filed collateral attack.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion by finding Qureshi 
was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to raise an argument that could not have 
                                              
7 The BIA also found Qureshi failed to comply with the procedural requirements set 
down in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), for remanding based on 
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because we find Qureshi’s ineffective 
assistance claim fails on substantive grounds, we need not decide whether Qureshi 
substantially complied with the Lozada requirements. 
8 The petitioner in Paredes had filed a collateral challenge to his conviction in New 
Jersey state court.  528 F.3d at 198.  We rejected his argument that his convictions could 
not be considered valid and final while his collateral challenge was pending.  Id. at 198–
99.  Qureshi’s case is even more straightforward, as Qureshi’s argument before the BIA 
appears to be the only route through which he has chosen to challenge his conviction as 
invalid—he does not claim to have filed any collateral attack in New York state court.   
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altered the outcome of the proceedings.9                        
 We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s dismissal of Qureshi’s appeal of the 
IJ’s denial of discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  The BIA 
affirmed the IJ’s determination that the equities presented in the record—including 
Qureshi’s criminal record, lack of rehabilitation, family ties, and long residence in the 
United States—on balance weighed against cancellation of Qureshi’s removal.  The 
Immigration and Naturalization Act renders this denial of discretionary relief 
unreviewable by this Court.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).   
B. 
 Qureshi also filed a timely petition for review of the BIA’s March 14, 2016, 
opinion and order denying his motion to reconsider.  Qureshi raised three grounds for 
reconsideration: (1) the BIA wrongly concluded Qureshi failed to comply with Lozada’s 
procedural requirements for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (2) the 
BIA wrongly characterized his claim regarding the insufficiency of the complaint 
                                              
9 There are additional reasons to believe Qureshi’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of 
the complaint would fail.  First, the felony complaint Qureshi contends is defective 
alleges he “subjected another person to sexual contact without the latter’s consent.”  A.R. 
49.  Second, Qureshi fails to account for the different standard of sufficiency that New 
York courts apply to complaints as opposed to criminal informations.  Qureshi relies 
extensively upon New York v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71 (N.Y. 1987), to contend that the 
complaint in his case lacked factual allegations regarding the element of lack of consent.  
But it was a criminal information at issue in Alejandro, not a complaint like the one at 
issue in this case.  The court in Alejandro observed complaints are not subject to the same 
stringent factual requirements as a criminal information.  Id. at 73–74 & n.2.  “The 
‘prima facie case’ requirement—that the factual part establish every element of the 
offense charged . . . —applies . . . to informations alone.”  Id. at 73.  Qureshi provides no 
authority for applying Alejandro’s requirements to the complaint underlying his 
conviction.      
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underlying his 1997 conviction as a collateral attack on that conviction; and (3) the BIA 
wrongly concluded his 1997 conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude.   
 A motion to reconsider must be based on errors of fact or law; mere disagreement 
with the outcome is not sufficient.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).  
The BIA found Qureshi’s motion to reconsider “reiterate[d] the arguments raised in his 
previous motions to the Board[,]” A.R. 3, and we see no error in its conclusion.   
 First, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Qureshi’s submission of 
additional evidence in support of his claim of compliance with the Lozada requirements.  
A motion to reconsider is not a proper vehicle for submitting evidence the petitioner had 
under his control but failed to submit at the time of his initial hearing.  See Huang v. Att’y 
Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 390–91 (3d Cir. 2010); In re O–S–G–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60 (BIA 
2006).  Moreover, even if the BIA erred in its conclusion regarding Qureshi’s Lozada 
compliance, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails for substantive reasons as 
well.  See supra Part II.A. 
 Nor did the BIA mischaracterize Qureshi’s argument regarding the invalidity of 
the complaint underlying his conviction.  The BIA correctly observed Qureshi could not 
show prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise the alleged defect in the criminal complaint 
because nothing his counsel could have argued to the IJ about the validity of the 
conviction would have altered the outcome.  Criminal convictions, unless already 
overturned, are treated as valid in immigration proceedings.  Paredes, 528 F.3d at 198–
99; Drakes v. I.N.S., 330 F.3d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 2003).  Because criminal convictions are 
not subject to collateral attack as part of a removal proceeding, the BIA correctly found 
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Qureshi cannot show prejudice based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 Finally, the BIA did not commit legal error in its analysis of whether Qureshi’s 
1997 conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude.  The BIA addressed this issue 
in the context of evaluating whether Qureshi met his burden to show he was prejudiced 
by his counsel’s concession of removability.  It was Qureshi’s burden to show, absent his 
counsel’s concession, his conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree would not have 
been considered a crime of moral turpitude.  See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 158–59.  In 
concluding he did not make this showing, the BIA cited similar statutes from other states 
where the courts have determined the crimes involved moral turpitude.  There was no 
error in this approach.  See Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 414–16 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(assessing whether assault on a law enforcement officer in violation of New Jersey law 
was a crime involving moral turpitude by comparing cases involving similar assault 
statutes under New York, Massachusetts, and Texas state law); Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 
1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is often helpful to determine whether a state crime 
involves moral turpitude by comparing it with crimes that have previously been found to 
involve moral turpitude.” (internal quotations omitted)).   
 Because Qureshi has failed to identify any factual or legal errors underlying the 
BIA’s decision denying his motion to remand and dismissing his appeal, we will deny his 
petition for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss as untimely Qureshi’s petition for 
review of the BIA order dated December 11, 2015, and deny his petition for review of the 
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BIA order dated March 14, 2016.   
